Dutta (1995) studies dynamic stochastic games with finite states, and proves a folk theorem that holds as players become very patient (so that players discount vanishingly little both the time until the next period and the expected time until the next state transition). Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2011) extend that analysis to the case of imperfect moitoring. Here, we consider the case where the length of a period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting remains fixed. In this case, the discounting between periods shrinks to zero in the limit, but the discounting of the expected time until a state transition does not. Our main result is a folk theorem that holds under Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin's (1994) monitoring conditions. We do not require that the stochastic game be irreducible. * We thank Drew Fudenberg, Johannes Hörner, and Nicolas Vieille for helpful discussions.
Introduction
Stochastic games are generalizations of repeated games in which the payoffs in a period depend not only on the current action profile but also on a state value, whose random evolution is itself influenced by players' actions. Stochastic games allow for dynamic interaction between players, but do not impose the strong restriction that the parameters of the interaction in one period are independent of outcomes in previous periods (or, indeed , that the parameters are identical across periods). Important economic examples are models with stock variables such as capital, savings, or technology; models with persistent shocks to demand, productivity, or income; models of durable goods markets; and political economy models where government policy changes at discrete intervals. Dutta (1995) derives a folk theorem for stochastic games with finite states and perfect monitoring. In particular, he shows that as players become very patient (so that the discounted time until the state changes shrinks to zero), then any feasible vector of payoffs that guarantees each player at least his minmax payoff can be attained (more precisely, it can be approximated arbitrarily closely) in equilibrium. Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) (from now on, "FY") and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2011) ("HSTV") provide conditions on imperfect public monitoring (in each period players observe the state and a noisy signal of the action profile just played) under which Dutta's (1995) folk theorem extends. All three results require that the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs be independent of the initial state as the discount factor δ approaches 1. That condition will be satisfied if the game is irreducible -that is, if no single player's deviation can prevent the Markov process governing the state variable from being irreducible.
In this paper, we consider an alternative limiting case for stochastic games: the length of a period shrinks, but the players' rate of time discounting remains fixed. In the limit, the discounting between periods shrinks, but the discounted time until a state transition does not (since we interpret the transition rate as a rate per unit of time, not per period). In many economic settings, where players get frequent opportunities to adjust their actions, but the state changes more rarely, our model may be more natural. For example, competing firms must set prices and choose how much to invest in research each period, but technological breakthroughs that reduce costs occur infrequently.
Similarly, regulatory policies may change only when a new government is elected, but firms or individuals interact with each frequently in the meantime.
In our setting, the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs does depend on the initial state, even as the time between periods shrinks, because the discounted fraction of the game that players expected to spend in that state before the first transition is nonnegligible. A strategy profile can only be part of an equilibrium, then, if it delivers continuation payoffs that are individually rational, given the current state, after each history -the payoffs thus achievable are ex post individually rational, in Dutta's (1995) terminology. Our main result is again a folk theorem. We show that under Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin's (1994) conditions on public monitoring, any payoff vector that is ex post individually rational in the initial state is achievable in a perfect public equilibrium, if the time between periods is short enough. Dutta (1995) , FY, and HSTV use irreducibility to ensure that in the limit the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. Since the property will in general not hold in our model, we do not require irreducibility. We can allow, for example, multiple absorbing states, each reachable from the initial state -the first firm to achieve a technological breakthrough might permanently capture the market, for instance.
We do require that the set of ex post individually rational payoffs have full dimension, starting from any state.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we describe the model, and in the following section we present the folk theorem. In Section 4 we investigate the properties of the ex post individually rational sets, and give some sufficient conditions for full dimensionality. Section 5 is the conclusion.
Model
There are N expected-utility maximizing players playing an infinite-horizon stochastic game. The time between periods is given by ∆ > 0, and all players discount the future at rate r > 0 (so that the per-period discount rate is ݁ ି∆ ‫ؠ‬ ߜ). There is a finite set 
௬‫א‬
Denote by g(a, s) the vector of expected payoffs for each player. At the end of a period in which action profile a is played in state s, the probability that the state changes to state s′ ≠ s is equal to ∆ߛ ොሺ‫ݏ‬ ᇱ ; ܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ: the constant rate ߛ ොሺ‫ݏ‬ ᇱ ; ܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ multiplied by the period length ∆. That is, the transition probability per unit of time is fixed, so (for small ∆) the transition probability per period is proportional to the length of the period. With the remaining probability 1 -∆ߛ ොሺܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ, where
the state does not change. Note that when the period length ∆ is close to zero, then the discount rate per period δ is approximately equal to 1 -r∆, and so the probability of transition from state s to state s′ given action profile a in each period, ∆ߛ ොሺ‫ݏ‬ ᇱ ; ܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ, is approximately equal to ሺ1 െ ߜሻ భ ߛ ොሺ‫ݏ‬ ᇱ ; ܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ. Since we will focus on the limiting case as ∆ → 0, for notational simplicity we will re-specify the per-period transition probabilities as ሺ1 െ ߜሻߛሺ‫ݏ‬ ᇱ ; ܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ, where
Similarly, we re-specify the probability that no transition occurs as 1 െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻγሺܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ, where ߛሺܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ ‫ؠ‬ ߛሺ‫ݏ‬ ᇱ ; ܽ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ.
௦ᇱஷ௦
We will then consider the limit as δ → 1.
All these definitions extend in a natural way to mixed actions. This structure is common knowledge. We assume that a public randomization device is available to the players.
The set of public histories in period t is equal to . For any public history h t , let s(h t ) ≡ s t denote the current state.
A strategy for player i is a mapping α i : ‫ܪ‬ ՜ ‫ܣ∆‬ , and a public strategy for player i is a mapping σ i : ‫ܪ‬ ՜ ‫ܣ∆‬ . Let Σ i and Σ , respectively, denote the set of strategies and the set of public strategies for player i; let Σ and Σ P denote the sets of strategy profiles and of public strategy profiles, respectively. Given a profile of strategies α ∈ Σ and an initial state s ∈ S, player i's expected payoff in the dynamic game is given by
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution over actions and states induced by the strategy α and initial state s. For each public strategy σ ∈ Σ P and public history h ∈ H, the continuation payoffs ‫ݒ‬ δ ሺߪ, ݄ሻ are calculated in the usual way. 
More generally, we can represent the expected payoff from playing profile a for one period, given continuation payoffs u, as a convex combination of the pseudoinstantaneous payoff and the continuation payoff if no state transition occurs:
This definition will be useful later.
Feasible and individually rational payoffs
Given discount factor δ, define the (convex hull of) the set of feasible payoffs in initial state s, ܸ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ, as
Note that, in contrast to the setting in FY and HSTV, the set of feasible payoffs ܸ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ That is, the identifiability condition requires that FLM's Condition 6.2 and 6.3 hold in each state. 
Results
FLM's folk theorem requires that the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs has nonempty interior. Here, we require not only that the set of feasible and 1 FLM's folk theorem (Theorem 6.2) requires either the pairwise full rank condition or that every pureaction, Pareto-efficient profile is pairwise identifiable for all pairs of players. In our setting, the appropriate analog would be Pareto efficiency in terms of the pseudo-instantaneous payoffs, which are endogenous (since they depend on continuation values after a state change). Thus, we do not focus on that condition.
individually rational payoffs has nonempty interior in each state, but also that there exists a strategy that yields continuation payoffs in that interior after every history. That is, we require that ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ has full dimension for each state s. With that definition, we can state our main result, a folk theorem: Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 be given. Suppose that the Uniform Interior Condition and the Identifiability Condition hold. Then there exists δ* < 1 such that the following holds: for any initial state s, any δ ≥ δ*, and any ‫ݒ‬ ‫א‬ ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ, there exists a perfect public equilibrium strategy profile σ such that ‫ݒ‬ δ ሺߪ, ‫ݏ‬ሻ = v.
The proof is based on the techniques in the proof of FLM's folk theorem for games with imperfect public monitoring. That proof shows that any smooth set of payoffs W strictly in the interior of the feasible and individually rational set can be attained in equilibrium -a key step is to show that any payoff on the boundary of W can be achieved as the weighted average of a stage-game payoff in the current period that lies outside W (thus the requirement that W is strictly in the interior of the feasible set) and expected continuation payoffs that lie in W. Here, we want to do something similar, with pseudo-instantaneous payoffs taking the place of the stage-game payoffs. We have to do some work to ensure that there is a pseudo-payoff outside ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ in each direction (and, of course, for every state). As a building block, we considers strategies that, after each period, with positive probability switch permanently to a strategy that yields payoffs in the middle of ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ. Later (in Lemma 3), we will show that any payoff in ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ can be attained with such strategies.
η η η η-Modified Strategies
Given ε, δ, and d, suppose that the d-uniform interior at (δ, ε) condition holds.
Let scalar η ∈ (0, 1), public strategy profile σ, and payoff vectors ‫ݒ‬ ൌ ൫‫ݒ‬ ௦ ൯ ௦‫א‬ௌ such that
ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ for each state s be given. For each s, let σ s denote a strategy that yields ‫ݒ‬ ௦ in state s, and at least ݉ ఋ ൫‫ݏ‬ሺ݄ሻ൯ ε for all players after every history. (Such a strategy exists by the definition of ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ.) We define the η-modified strategy ߪ ఎ ሺߪ, ‫ݒ‬ሻ in the following way: 2 there are K + 1 regimes, regime 0 and regime s for each state s. Play begins in regime 0. After any period in which play was in regime 0, the state was s, and the state did not change, the regime switches to s with probability η(1 -δ), and otherwise remains in regime 0. After any period in which play was in regime 0, the state was s, and the state transitioned to s′ ≠ s, the regime switches to s′ with probability η, and otherwise remains in regime 0. Regime s is absorbing for all s. In regime 0, strategy ߪ ఎ ሺߪ, ‫ݒ‬ሻ specifies exactly the same play as strategy σ. If play switches to regime s after period t, then in each period τ > t, after τ -period history ሺ݄ ௧ , ݄ ఛି௧ ), strategy ߪ ఎ ሺߪ, ‫ݒ‬ሻ follows the prescription of strategy ߪ ௦ ሺ݄ ఛି௧ ). That is, the continuation payoff after the switch to regime s is ‫ݒ‬ ௦ .
Next, define the set of individually rational payoffs achievable using η-modified strategies, starting from state s:
and
Our first lemma establishes that for any state s and any payoff v ∈ ܸ ఋ,ఎ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ, we can pick any direction and find an action profile a and continuation payoffs in ܸ ఋ,ఎ ሺ‫ݏ‬Ԣሻ (where ‫ݏ‬Ԣ is the state in the next period) such that the pseudo-payoff from a is at least δηd farther in that direction than any payoff in ܸ ఋ,ఎ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ. The intuition is that η-modified strategies have continuation payoffs that with positive probability lie in the middle of the set ܸ ఋ,ఎ ሺ‫ݏ‬Ԣሻ -by using continuation payoffs that always lie on the extreme of ܸ ఋ,ఎ ሺ‫ݏ‬Ԣሻ in the desired direction, we can do better. Formalizing that simple idea requires some algebra. be the expected value of ‫ݑ‬ ௦ ᇲ ሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ when a is played.
(Note that these are also the continuation payoffs under σ η (σ,‫)ݒ‬ if play stays in regime 0.)
We can write ‫ݒ‬ ௦ ‫כ‬ as
where u(a) = ሺ‫ݑ‬ ௦ ᇲ ሺܽሻሻ ௦ᇱ‫א‬ௌ . Thus,
Similarly, ߣ · ሾ‫ݒ‬ ௦ ‫כ‬ െ ‫ݑ‬ ௦ ሺܽሻሿ ≥ 0, and ߣ · ሾ‫ݒ‬ ௦ ‫כ‬ െ ‫ݒ‬ ௦ ሿ ≥ d, so we have 
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Our next lemma shows that for any state s and any ε > 0, the set ܸ ఌ ఋ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ (of payoffs from strategies that give payoffs at least ε in the interior of the feasible and individually rational set after each history) is contained in the set ܸ ఋ,ఎ ሺ‫ݏ‬ሻ (of payoffs achieved through η-modified strategies), if the probability η of a regime change is small enough. That distance shrinks to 0 with η.
Q.E.D.
Now we can prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Follows FLM's proof of Theorem 6.2.
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